We present different versions of a conjecture which would express that first price mechanisms never work very badly in a very general class of problems. The definitions include most of the problems where there is a principal (seller) who has the right to exclude others from the game. The exact definitions are motivated by the "first price mechanism" in E Cs: "Efficient Teamwork" [1] , but the conjecture is relevant for most auction problems, e.g. for combinatorial auctions.
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n}. We have a prior distribution µ on Θ = Θ 0 × Θ 1 × Θ 2 × ... × Θ n , an offer (or action) set A, ∅ ∈ A, and two functions (valuation) v : A N → R and (utility) u : Θ × A N → R N . We assume that ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀a −i ∈ A N \{i} : u i θ, (a −i , ∅) = 0, which will express that rejected players get utility 0. There is a function (decision) d :
The strategy set of player i is the set of functions S i = {Θ i → A}. For a strategy profile
Assume that for each i ∈ N, there exists a (truthful) strategy τ i ∈ S i satisfying
Note that (1) implies u i θ, d τ (θ) = 0, and therefore, we did not need these terms in the right hand side of (2).
Assume that, for each r ∈ A and x ∈ R, there exists an offer denoted by r + x ∈ A satisfying that ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀i ∈ N, ∀a −i ∈ A N \{i} :
expressing that one can always make an offer which is worse by x in the evaluation, but would provide x higher utility.
We might have some further optional properties, as we will see later.
Let us define the marginal contribution of an offer a i of a player i ∈ N by
There is a function f : R → R (maybe a constant) so that there always exists an equilibrium s ∈ S satisfying
We also conjecture that any reasonable process which starts from τ and searches for an equilibrium, finds an equilibrium satisfying the inequality. Unfortunately the inequality does not hold for all equilibria, and does not hold without expectation.
We can get weaker versions of the conjecture by assuming some of the following properties. We may assume that whether a player wins with an offer or with a constant higher offer has no effect on the other players:
We may assume that the set of offers is convex, namely, ∀p, q ∈ A and λ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a strategy denoted by λp + (1 − λ)q ∈ A satisfying that ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀i ∈ N, ∀a −i ∈ A N \{i} :
We may assume that each player can submit multiple offers, namely, ∀p, q ∈ A, there exists an offer denoted by p ∧ q ∈ A satisfying that ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀i ∈ N, ∀a −i ∈ A N \{i} :
and with the very same r,
Furthermore, we may assume that |Θ 0 | = 1 expressing that the principal has no strategic capacity.
Finally, we may rephrase the conjecture aiming for a lower bound on the social welfare rather than on the revenue of the principal, by replacing (3) to the following.
